The European Union and the EU countries fund about half of the $9 million FCTC Secretariat budget. The Commission recently awarded WHO-FCTC a complementary grant of Euros 5.2 million. If you want to look at the details of this grant you have to go to this pdf document and scroll down to page 7 to click on the Annex B link and scroll down again. Since I am curious about how funds are allocated I did all those tedious moves. Below are some of my comments.
First, one can regret that the access to the relevant information is not easier. Requiring people to scroll down various pdf documents is not the easiest way to share information. One learns on page 23 that there had been a pilot project and that this new grant is a "scaling up" of the pilot phase. The note (35) tells us that there were 7 pilot countries, including tow in Africa, Ghana and Lesotho. Apparently the countries were chosen because their governments had showed a specific interest and commitment in implementing the FCTC. One can wonder now about the choice of Ghana considering the apparent reluctance of its government to move ahed with tobacco control regulations.
The new phase should involve about 30 countries, selected through a process I am unable to explain. If I understand well, the main stakeholders will be national governements while the civil society will be asked to promote transparency and an objective approach to assessing the implementation (p. 28). I did not see any specific requirements for transparency so they could only be lip service to the concept.
On page 29 we find the provisional budget breakdown:
42% for human resources (with 71% going for FCTC staff? if I understand correctly?)
15% for travel (that would be Euros 780K)
9% for local equipment
27% for other costs (what are "other costs"?
7% for administrative costs (how are those different from the staff? would that mean the administrative costs of the project are about 49% or more since we have no idea what the 27% other costs are?
The next section is devoted to 'Performance and monitoring" but it looks mostly like lip service with no clear commitment to any type of independent evaluation. The evaluation and audit will be 'jointly agreed by the beneficiary parties", will they be made public? How about the evaluation of the pilot phase? Is it available?
The same goes for the "Communication and visibility" section despite the affirmation that "there will be an emphasis on communication and visibility issues" and that "funds should be set aside for communication". How many blogs and/or facebook pages will be eventually created and regularly provided with significant content?
If you have questions of your own you can contact: [email protected]
Do I have any suggestions? What about implementing the ten points of my Transparency Scorecard?
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Surfing a little more to collect information about evaluation of EU-UN contracts I found this that I found interesting, but it still requires lots of reading... Here is an excerpt:
Final Report – Volume I – May 2008 Page 48
The Commission’s (desired) involvement in management activities under UN bodies’
responsibility has proved a real source of contention with the UN at operational level in certain
cases. It raises the issue of the dividing-line between cooperation and interference, as illustrated
in the diagram below. It is due to differences in the constituencies and mandate, accountability
systems, business practices, history and expectations specific to each of both organisations; with
subsequent contradictions in the requirements and expectations .
Not just donor!
Partnership = Involvement
in strategic choices
Point of view at the
European Commission Point of view at theUnited Nations
Accountability problems!
Lack of information
due to UN reporting
weaknesses
No interference!
Partnership = Respect
between equals
Commission is highly
demanding donor!
Specific Commission
requirements
vs. other donors
Commission staff have often been confronted in UN interventions with significant delays in
reporting as well as with inadequate reporting quality, particularly regarding management
information (see 3.8.1). This has posed problems in terms of accountability, owing to the fact
that task managers have a personal liability for funds under their responsibility according to the
Financial Regulations. This was particularly critical when the amounts at stake were substantial
and when there were shared risks and co-responsibilities. This increased the pressure for
detailed scrutiny. It was also amplified by the fact that Commission task managers could not
request a financial audit of the projects executed by the UN in the way that they could for
NGOs. For the Elections in DRC (UNDP), for instance, information provided to the
Commission was viewed as insufficient and obliged the Commission to take abnormal
financial risks to avoid blocking the implementation of a politically important and sensitive
project. Such a pro-active attitude from both sides to the taking of risks for the sake of the
project’s outcome in a very difficult situation was thus critical to the success of the elections,
albeit in contravention of procedures.
Within UN bodies there are countless voices at operational and HQ levels describing the
Commission as a highly demanding donor. Whereas most donors, including the EU
Member States, rely widely on the UN bodies’ own systems once an agreement is reached (i.e.
true delegation of management), the Commission, mainly because of its Financial Regulation,
demands heavy attention from UN bodies (e.g. in terms of reporting, submission of projects)
and duplicates several activities carried out by the UN (e.g. audits, verifications, evaluations)66
although in accordance with FAFA provisions. This requires distinct management of
Commission funds (see EQ 8).
66 For instance, FAO staff reported that for the Desert Locust project, a verification mission was performed by a French firm
commissioned by the Commission, while the FAO had already an independent external evaluation.
EVALUATION OF COMMISSION’S EXTERNAL COOPERATION
WITH PARTNER COUNTRIES THROUGH THE ORGANISATIONS
OF THE UN FAMILY ADE
Final Report – Volume I – May 2008 Page 49
Whereas both the Commission and the UN claim a real “partnership” relationship, they
have a different understanding on what it means:
Commission point of view: Commission staff stated on various occasions that the
Commission seeks to be treated as a partner by the UN, meaning not just as a donor
providing pure project financing. It expects to be involved in the strategic choices made
during the intervention’s implementation. It also considers that it should be involved in
day-to-day decisions with heavy financial implications when the Commission provides a
substantial part of the funds (such as in the case of a call for proposals by UNDP for
computers, representing more than €40m for the Elections in DRC).
UN point of view: UN representatives stated in numerous interviews and focus groups
that they wish the UN to be treated as a partner by the Commission, that is not just as an
executing agency as previously. Commission and UN staff indeed report that the history
of their partnership was initially more a contractor-implementer relationship with supply-
and-demand dynamics, given the difficult financial situation of the UN at the time. It has
however evolved over time. UN representatives reported in consequence that they are
absolutely opposed to direct involvement in management activities given that they are fully
in charge of implementation and that it is a source of interference. They also consider that
there is no justification for giving the Commission more say than other donors. In addition,
they point out that the issue has important financial, legal and other implications.
Link to the Transparency Website of the EC
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/index_en.htm
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