Thank you Wendy for accepting our " rendez-vous ". May I ask you to introduce yourself ?
I have worked as a researcher in the University of Massachusetts-Amherst School of Public Health since September 1997.
I was hired by Assistant Professor Michael E. Begay, in the Community Health Studies Department, who received a grant from the (national organization of the) American Cancer Society on January 1, 1996, to study state and local tobacco control policymaking in Massachusetts.
I came to UMass with a background in political science, theology, and policy-related activism.
I thoroughly enjoy researching and writing about state and local tobacco control issues, as well as discussing the study results with anyone who is interested.
1. In your study "The battle to appropriate tobacco tax
revenues in Massachusetts" you are trying to explain why an important
part of the funds was diverted to other programs.
It seems the activists were not really prepared to manage their political victory.
You list 21 recommendations (p.83/85) that are all very worthy. If you had only 3 to pick, which ones would you choose?
My first recommendation is to hire professional, politically savvy personnel, specifically a lobbyist, a grassroots coordinator, and a media director to take charge of the implementation process.
Campaigning for and passing aballot initiative requires one set of skills, while working to make sure that the voters' mandate is carried out by policymakers requires a totally different set of skills.
In Massachusetts, the good reputation of the American Cancer Society and other members of the Massachusetts Coalition for a Healthy Future (MCHF) fostered confidence in the voting public, and certainly helped to pass the ballot initiative.
The tobacco industry has a comparatively poor public image, and it was therefore at a disadvantage during the campaign stage, where public perception is very important.
However, the tobacco industry employs professionals to represent their interests to policymakers, to organize state and local resistance to anti-tobacco policies, and to paint industry activities in the best possible light for the public.
Tobacco control advocates must counter the tobacco industry's far-reaching political power and influence by hiring professional political advocates, grassroots activists, and media directors.
The tobacco industry would not rely on amateurs to do this work, and neither should the tobacco control community.
My second recommendation is to have a concrete set of strategies and goals in place before the initiative passes, to which all members of the coalition agree, in order to avoid conflicts of interest during the implementation stage.
In Massachusetts, the pro-health groups that were a part of the MCHF had substantially different ideas about how the new tax revenues raised by the initiative should be spent.
Consequently, after passage, the coalition had to confront massive splintering of its member organizations.
These differences of opinion regarding the appropriation of the new tax revenues led to significant diversions of these funds, at a time when the coalition should have been acting as a united front in the political sphere.
Having solid strategies, goals, and budget proposals in place before passage of the initiative will make it possible to avoid many of the pitfalls that were experienced by the Massachusetts coalition during implementation.
My third recommendation is that tobacco control advocates use the momentum from their campaign victory to launch immediately into post-passage action.
Advocates must knowledgeably wield the power attained through the defeat of the multi-billion-dollar tobacco industry in order to systematically and pervasively influence the way that policymakers implement the initiative.
Make sure that constituents are aware of the process every step of the way, and that policymakers are receiving the same message from constituents that they are getting from professional political advocates.
Every action by tobacco control advocates should bring the coalition one step closer to materially realizing the policy-related collective will of the voters.
Tuesday, February 16 1999
Thank you Wendy for accepting our " rendez-vous ".
May I ask you to introduce yourself ?
I have worked as a researcher in the University of Massachusetts-Amherst School of Public Health since September 1997.
I was hired by Assistant Professor Michael E. Begay, in the Community Health Studies Department, who received a grant from the (national organization of the) American Cancer Society on January 1, 1996, to study state and local tobacco control policymaking in Massachusetts.
I came to UMass with a background in political science, theology, and policy-related activism.
I thoroughly enjoy researching and writing about state and local tobacco control issues, as well as discussing the study results with anyone who is interested.
First question: In your study "The battle to appropriate tobacco tax revenues in Massachusetts" you are trying to explain why an important part of the funds was diverted to other programs.
It seems the activists were not really prepared to manage their political victory.
You list 21 recommendations (p.83/85) that are all very worthy. If you had only 3 to pick, which ones would you choose?
My first recommendation is to hire professional, politically savvy personnel, specifically a lobbyist, a grassroots coordinator, and a media director to take charge of the implementation process.
Campaigning for and passing aballot initiative requires one set of skills, while working to make sure that the voters' mandate is carried out by policymakers requires a totally different set of skills.
In Massachusetts, the good reputation of the American Cancer Society and other members of the Massachusetts Coalition for a Healthy Future (MCHF) fostered confidence in the voting public, and certainly helped to pass the ballot initiative.
The tobacco industry has a comparatively poor public image, and it was therefore at a disadvantage during the campaign stage, where public perception is very important.
However, the tobacco industry employs professionals to represent their interests to policymakers, to organize state and local resistance to anti-tobacco policies, and to paint industry activities in the best possible light for the public.
Tobacco control advocates must counter the tobacco industry's far-reaching political power and influence by hiring professional political advocates, grassroots activists, and media directors.
The tobacco industry would not rely on amateurs to do this work, and neither should the tobacco control community.
My second recommendation is to have a concrete set of strategies and goals in place before the initiative passes, to which all members of the coalition agree, in order to avoid conflicts of interest during the implementation stage.
In Massachusetts, the pro-health groups that were a part of the MCHF had substantially different ideas about how the new tax revenues raised by the initiative should be spent.
Consequently, after passage, the coalition had to confront massive splintering of its member organizations.
These differences of opinion regarding the appropriation of the new tax revenues led to significant diversions of these funds, at a time when the coalition should have been acting as a united front in the political sphere.
Having solid strategies, goals, and budget proposals in place before passage of the initiative will make it possible to avoid many of the pitfalls that were experienced by the Massachusetts coalition during implementation.
My third recommendation is that tobacco control advocates use the momentum from their campaign victory to launch immediately into post-passage action.
Advocates must knowledgeably wield the power attained through the defeat of the multi-billion-dollar tobacco industry in order to systematically and pervasively influence the way that policymakers implement the initiative.
Make sure that constituents are aware of the process every step of the way, and that policymakers are receiving the same message from constituents that they are getting from professional political advocates.
Every action by tobacco control advocates should bring the coalition one step closer to materially realizing the policy-related collective will of the voters.
2. You put the emphasis on the need for "politically experienced"
people and three key positions are indicated (p.65): a lobbyist, a
grassroots coordinator, a media director.
Why?
Oops -- I should have read ahead! I believe that I answered this question in my first recommendation, above.
3. It is clear that the "debate" about the tobacco control budget
is an ongoing process where each year one has to be ready to defend and
eventually ask for more.
Do you feel the health advocates are now well aware of this and duly organized, or are they still "learning the ropes"?
The Massachusetts coalition is now much more politically astute than it was in 1991, when it first took up the cause of passing a new tobacco tax to be used for the state's tobacco education, prevention, and cessation programs.
Since inception, 39% (over $275M) of these tax revenues have been diverted to programs with little or no tobacco-related content.
However, the coalition still seems reticent to demand that the funds be used exclusively for tobacco-related programs, as required by the language of the initiative.
The overarching feeling seems to be that compromise (with the Administration and the Legislature) is the first priority because advocates do not want tobacco control programs to lose any more money than they have lost already.
My sense of the coalition is that it still perceives itself as at the mercy of policymakers, when, in fact, it has the formidable power of the voting public behind it.
In my opinion, the coalition should adopt an aggressive, proactive political posture and act like the political powerhouse that it is.
The massive budget cuts leveled against tobacco control programs in Massachusetts since inception of this tobacco tax should be a sign to advocates that being submissive and reactionary in the political arena does not work to the advantage of the tobacco control community.
4. You looked at the situation in Massachusetts.
You expressed the hope that the lessons learned there can be used elsewhere.
Did you get any feedback following the publishing of your study that would indicate people in other states did take notice?
I have received many requests for copies of this study from tobacco control advocates and organizations around the country.
As the study becomes more widely available (directly from me, and hopefully on the Globalink web site), and more widely read, I will receive feedback from folks in other states who are trying to pass or implement an initiative that is similar to the Massachusetts tobacco tax initiative discussed here.
I also think thatthis study has implications for the 46 U.S. states that reached a settlement with the tobacco industry last October.
Tobacco control advocates in Massachusetts and other states can learn from the successes and failures of the Massachusetts coalition.
They should organize now to try to have their share of the $206B in settlement money appropriated for tobacco education, prevention, and cessation programs.
If advocates in those states do not act immediately, that windfall of revenues will simply be absorbed by each state's general fund, and dispersed for everything under the sun.
This money from the tobacco industry should be used to fight tobacco use and addiction, rather than be regarded as a general stream of new revenues.
By focusing settlement dollars on anti-tobacco programs, we force tobacco companies to be active participants in their own demise -- the ultimate goal for every tobacco control activist!
5. Despite the new communication tools I sometimes feel that tobacco
control activists remain fairly isolated and not aware of what happens
elsewhere.
The type of "political organizing" skills and problems you depict
seems to me less often studied than "medical issues" like cessation
techniques.
Is there a lack of political consciousness/experience in this movement?
Are those organizing questions considered less important?
When they are not still largely ignored?
I agree that tobacco-related studies focused on medical issues are far more prevalent than health policy studies.
One reason for this would seem to be that tobacco control advocates use the information provided in medical studies to educate the public about the dangers of tobacco smoke, in order to justify subsequent tobacco control policies.
Continued study of the medical issues is important for the medical and tobacco control communities alike.
However, tobacco policy studies should be generously funded, and
the study results should be widely disseminated so every new policy
attempt does not require advocates to "reinvent the wheel."
We have a great deal to learn from one another, and tobacco control
advocates around the country and throughout the world should make a
concerted effort to use one another as resources.
The tobacco industry wastes no time and learns from its mistakes -- so, too, must the tobacco control community.
Focusing studies on tobacco control policymaking, and bolstering national and international communication around tobacco control issues, are two ways to produce more efficient and successful tobacco-related political interventions.
What you feel like adding :
If anyone wishes to receive a hard copy or an electronic copy of the study, please feel free to contact me (info below).
I look forward to future dialogues around these issues!
Thank you Wendy for taking the time to be with us today.
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