Tuesday, July 6, 1999
Thank you Jack for accepting our "rendez-vous". May I ask you to introduce yourself?
I am an independent tobacco control activist in the state of Florida. I am the author of the Florida Clean Indoor Air Act and have played a direct role in the wording and successful passage of local Florida clean indoor air ordinances enacted in Palm Beach County, Martin County and the City of Gainesville.
I played a very active role in the Florida Youth Access Law most notably by providing key legislators with the ammunition they needed to defeat a myriad of weakening amendments offered by the tobacco industry.
However the most important accomplishment was with the Florida Third-Party Medicaid Liability Act. On four occasions I was able to block the Florida Legislature from what appeared to be certain repeal.
This bureaucratic sounding piece of legislation has been characterized as the most important piece of tobacco control legislation ever passed by any legislative body. It provided the initiative for the Attorney General of Florida to proceed with with his suit against the tobacco industry. No other state was able to enact any piece of comparable legislation.
1. As I recall your involvement with tobacco control starts with smokefree workplaces and specifically at IBM where you used to work. I know it is a long story but can you share with us the main points?
Actually my involvement with tobacco control did not really start within IBM. I filed a "cease and desist" suit against IBM workplace-smoking practices in 1985. At this time the ordinances in Palm Beach County, Martin County and Gainesville had already been enacted. The suit against IBM was also filed after I had started the grass-roots initiative to enact the Florida Clean Indoor Air Act.
I was very vocal in IBM about their unrestricted smoking policies, often running high-level managers out of my development laboratory following a barrage of harsh admonitions against them.
This gave me quite a reputation and, in reality, no one would dare smoke in my presence - at least if they realized I was in the immediate area. However employees felt free to smoke anywhere else and their resulting waste product was recirculated through the central air-handling system to all employees.
My outspokenness on this subject also provided incentive to other employees to at least complain quietly. As these complaints became more numerous the IBM medical department circulated a confidential memo to all managers instructing the manager on the IBM-approved method to respond to employee complaints regarding smoking in the workplace. Basically the manager was instructed to counsel such employees on the fact (in their words) that tobacco smoke could not possibly hurt anyone. If the employee continued to complain, the manager was instructed to send the employee to the personnel office where such employees would be appropriately dealt with.
Of course, every manager who knew me gave me their "confidential memo". I responded - very loudly. Consequently I received a career guidance counseling session from one of the highest level managers within IBM. He was upset. He wanted to fire me but couldn't because I had been recently recognized as the most creative engineer at the Boca Raton location. Instead he bluntly warned me that if I "ever once" opened my mouth again about smoking on IBM premises I would be fired.
I left his office and proceeded to file my suit.
The suit was incredibly popular within IBM. The response from IBM employees and managers was phenomenal. Before IBM could file their response three more employees joined the suit.
I received huge press coverage. Every event was a front page news item. One newspaper repeated the same headline story two days in a row. When an investigative reporter revealed that IBM had gone to Philip Morris and received the services of Covington and Burling, the local personnel manager was heard to remark that it was the worst day in his life. This was prompted by the fact that employees had already formed a line waiting to voice their complaints by the time he arrived at work that morning.
But IBM corporate management wasn't bulging. When the IBM corporate personnel office made the recommendation that IBM acquiesce to all my demands they were rebuffed by IBM CEO and Chairman John Opel - apparently because IBM shared board of directors with Philip Morris.
IBM's continued defense of the suit was a local joke. Virtually no one seriously supported the defense. Someone would almost always inform me of whatever tactic IBM was pursuing. This was so well known that it was not unusual for someone attending a "secret" strategy meeting would stop by my office and ask me what their assignment was once they had forgotten. I always knew.
Ultimately I learned that the combined financial resources of IBM and Philip Morris exceeded my own. I had to withdraw the suit because of the financial drain imposed on me supporting the cost of the suit. However I won the issue.
Primarily due to the support of both IBM employees and managers alike IBM implemented every demand I listed in my filing. In fact they even added a few that I had not thought of. In their press release IBM claimed that they had planned to do this all along and my suit had affected nothing.
Some feathers had been ruffled though. IBM Chairman Opel promptly proceeded to order my firing. But this also caused IBM a problem.
My management chain refused to fire me. Finally the issue was "bucked up" four levels before a manager could be located who would follow through with Opel's order.
2. Do you think people are now more protected from ETS on the workplace? Are people still losing their job because they complain?
From my own perspective I would have to say that people are definitely more protected from ETS in the workplace. But I should make it clear that my perspective on workplace smoking is mostly confined to south Florida.
When the headlines against IBM (then the area's largest employer) hit the press I had employees from other companies calling me at IBM asking to join the suit not realizing that the suit would not directly affect them. This seemed to be having an effect on the policies of other companies operating in south Florida who did not wish to share the spotlight with IBM. As far as I know all local companies proceeded to ban workplace smoking. Some went a step further and banned it both inside and out.
The enactment of the Florida Clean Indoor Air Act followed shortly after the headlines started against IBM. This provided additional incentive for employers to enact restrictive policies.
I have actually had smokers ask me if I knew of any employers in the area who would allow them to smoke at work.
I certainly realize that what I have just described would not apply to all areas of the nation. The recent Globalink discussion of restaurant smoking in France underscores that much is yet to be accomplished.
As to whether people are still losing their jobs for complaining about workplace smoking, I would have to say that recently I personally have heard of more incidents about health advocates losing their jobs because they have been too effective in their activities against the tobacco industry.
3. Being a computer-engineer you were involved with internet from the beginning. You have your own site and you started the daily work that Gene Borio is now toiling with. Can you tell us about the role of the net and your role?
The Internet has proven to be the most important communications development since the telephone. It has enabled an organization such as Globalink to provide a communications network that enables tobacco control activists anywhere in the world to instantly communicate with another activist or group of activists anywhere else in the world. Often we can observe an inquiry on a difficult subject from someone receive excellent and timely responses from others that probably would have been impractical to contact otherwise.
I shudder to think of going back to a fax machine as a primary mass communication device.
It was six years ago that I started developing the enews which I am so thankful to have Gene continue. I am convinced that it proved to be one of the most important resources available for timely distribution of news to a wide and diversified audience.
4. You put on line a fair number of "secret documents" from the industry, that were leaked to you. Is it because people think you'll not be afraid to publish them?
That's a good question. This started a few years ago when I released some documents that were ultimately released as part of the Mangini set. I continue to receive such leaked documents which have found their way from my site to plaintiff's evidence in numerous legal proceeding against the tobacco industry.
5. You operate -I feel- mainly on your own, as a very active individual with many contacts. Can you tell us about your relationships with more established organizations or institutions? Do you get any support, are you looking for support? Is there some sort of cooperation or are you considered too independent, too radical? Does that matter?
I serve as a member of the board of directors for STAT. I have served as a member of the board of directors for the American Lung Association of Florida and the American Lung Association of Southeast Florida. I have also served as vice-president of GASP of MIAMI.
I do not receive any support.
The primary advancements in the state of Florida were accomplished by myself and two other individuals working independently.
The established organizations often referred to as health groups have not been active in the state of Florida. Stan Glantz' characterization of these groups as "wimpy" is actually quite charitable.
While there has been some sporadic support occasionally provided by one or the other of these organizations, more often than not these groups have worked to set Florida back in tobacco control often working directly or indirectly with tobacco industry lobbyists to advance the goals of the tobacco industry. As a consequence Florida is probably the only state that has gone backwards in tobacco control.
The Florida Youth Access law was weakened when one of the groups successfully enacted legislation that resulted in the emphasis on illegal tobacco sales to minors being shifted from the responsibility of unscrupulous merchants to the responsibility of the child.
The Florida Clean Indoor Air Act was weakened when one of the groups successfully enacted legislation that resulted in the maximum size of a restaurant smoking area being increased from 50% to 65%.
Other initiatives by these groups include:
Three failed attempts to enact smokers' rights legislation,
One failed attempt to mandate smoking areas in all public places regardless of the desire of the proprietor, and
One failed attempt to outlaw the use of "No Smoking" signs.
Undoubtedly the worst setback for tobacco control in Florida was a "smokeless states" grant of US$1.5 million. This brought together these groups whose primary goal seems to be the activity of issuing "We are the leader" press releases.
As a coalition they have agreed on only two goals; to impose a limitation on the extent the state can sue the tobacco industry and also the need for a law empowering them to control all tobacco control activism in the state of Florida. Thankfully they failed on both issues.
Your question is really quite timely. An excellent in-depth report entitled, TOBACCO INDUSTRY POLITICAL POWER AND INFLUENCE IN FLORIDA FROM 1979 TO 1999, authored by Michael S. Givel, PhD and Stanton A. Glantz, PhD has just been released by the Institute for Health Policy Studies, School of Medicine, University of California, San Francisco.
That report is available at:
http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/fl/
for anyone wishing to study this issue in greater depth.
Do you have anything else you would like to add?
No. This is already too long.
Thank you Jack for taking the time to be with us today.
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